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Disarming the Dangerous:
Preventing Extraordinary and Ordinary Violence
MARY D. FAN*
Mass shootings at Navy Yard, Newtown, Aurora, and elsewhere have jolted
Congress and the states into considering gun violence prevention. More than 1500
gun-related bills have been introduced since 2013, after the slaughter in Newtown
of twenty elementary-school children and six adults. Legislation and debates are
shaped by the specter of a heavily armed, mentally ill individual hunting in public
places such as schools, businesses, and workplaces. In the states, the most
successful type of legislation involves firearms restrictions for the mentally ill. In
Congress, the legislation that garnered the most debate was a ban on assault
weapons and large-capacity magazines. While the national attention to firearms
violence prevention is salutary, for law and policy to tackle the core of the problem
it is important to address two empirical questions: Who are the dangerous
individuals committing most firearms homicides, and why do the law’s current
screens miss them?
This Article draws on data from the National Violent Death Reporting System to
answer the crucial foundational questions of who poses a danger and why the
dangerous slip through existing legal screens. Presenting data on the most
prevalent place of shooting, the victim-shooter relationship, and the shooter’s prior
history, this Article shows that prevention of extraordinarily devastating firearms
violence calls for attention to how the nation addresses “ordinary” violence. By
ordinary violence, this Article means violence that is often viewed as mundane,
such as altercations between family members, friends, and intimates in the home.
Many perpetrators of firearms homicide have a history of such prior events—yet a
substantially smaller proportion of these violent episodes have been adjudicated,
thereby slipping through existing screens for firearms restrictions. Based on these
findings, the Article discusses how executive action steering scene-of-assault
procedure and discretion in dealing with ordinary violence can improve detection of
the dangerous regardless of whether proposed firearms restrictions survive the
gauntlet that besets new gun laws.
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INTRODUCTION
In the nation’s nightmares come true, a man with a gun hunts and kills outside
the home.1 A stranger to many of his victims, he is mentally disturbed.2 Bent on
mass killing, he has assault weapons and many rounds of ammunition.3 Suicidal as
well as homicidal, the threat of future penalties is no deterrent because he does not

1. E.g., From al-Shabaab to al-Nusra: How Westerners Joining Terror Groups
Overseas Affect the Homeland: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 113th
Cong. 38 (2013) (statement of Stephanie Sanok Kostro, Senior Fellow and Acting Director,
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism Program, Center for Strategic and International
Studies) (noting that attackers “need a soft target, such as shopping malls, theaters, concerts,
sporting events, or transportation systems” and referring to “soft targets, such as the 2011
parking lot shooting in Tucson, the 2012 Aurora theater incident, and the various school
shootings from the 1999 Columbine massacre to the 2007 Virginia Tech rampage to last
year’s tragedy in Sandy Hook”); WHITE HOUSE, NOW IS THE TIME: THE PRESIDENT’S PLAN
TO PROTECT OUR CHILDREN AND OUR COMMUNITIES BY REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE 2–3
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/wh_now_is_the
_time_full.pdf [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE, GUN VIOLENCE REDUCTION PLAN] (discussing
galvanizing incidents involving the schoolhouse shootings in Newtown; the movie theater
shootings in Aurora, Colorado; the shooting at a Sikh Temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin; and
the shootings at a Tucson, Arizona grocery store).
2. See, e.g., What Should America Do About Gun Violence?: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Cruz Statement] (statement of Sen.
Ted Cruz, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov
/imo/media/doc/1-30-13CruzStatement.pdf (discussing Newtown killings and bipartisan
agreement that the mentally ill should not have guns); Michael S. Schmidt, Gunman Said
Electronic Brain Attacks Drove Him to Violence, FBI Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2013, at
A17 (discussing mental troubles of shooter who killed twelve and injured three in
Washington, DC’s Navy Yard); Jonathan Zimmerman, Op-Ed., Stand Up to the Biggest
Bully in the Room: Mental Illness, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 25, 2013, at 18
(discussing mental disturbances of schoolhouse shooters).
3. See, e.g., What Should America Do About Gun Violence?: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter Kelly Statement] (statement of
Capt. Mark E. Kelly, U.S. Navy, Retired, Americans for Responsible Solutions), available at
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/1-30-13KellyTestimony.pdf
(“Dangerous
people with weapons specifically designed to inflict maximum lethality upon others have
turned every corner of our society into places of carnage and gross human loss.”); 159 CONG.
REC. S288–91 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 2013) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (discussing use
of semiautomatic assault weapons and large-capacity ammunition magazines or drums at
mass shootings at Sandy Hook; Aurora, Colorado; Virginia Tech; and Tucson, Arizona).
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envision a future.4 In just the brief span of a year, he has struck again and again,
catapulting the nation into the fractious debate over firearms regulation.5
The man’s face and crimes shift forms on a rapid reel. Eyes bulging from a
gaunt young face, he is Adam Lanza massacring twenty-six people—twenty of
them children—at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut.6
Smiling in uniform from happier days past, he is Christopher Dorner, who put
California on high alert after he gunned down a young couple, shot at police
officers, and vowed to hunt down officers who he believed wronged him.7 Head
shorn bare, with fixed stare, he is Aaron Alexis, who shot to death twelve people in
Washington, DC’s Navy Yard, while blocks away legislators prepared to mourn the
anniversary of the Newtown shootings and stalled firearm regulation legislation.8
Eyes unfocused, lips pursed, he is John Zawahri, who gunned down his father and
brother and then students at Santa Monica College, leaving six people dead and
scores more injured.9
These are just the shootings that made the national news in the last few months.
Since the schoolhouse shooting in Newtown in December 2012, there have been at
least sixteen mass shootings involving four or more fatalities.10 Since 2006, there

4. See, e.g., Karen E. Dill, Richard E. Redding, Peter K. Smith, Ray Surette & Dewey
G. Cornell, Recurrent Issues in Efforts To Prevent Homicidal Youth Violence in Schools:
Expert Opinions, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR YOUTH DEV., Spring 2011, at 113, 114 (“For those
youth who have decided to kill themselves as part of their attack, deterrence may seem
moot.”); Jeffrey Fagan, Death and Deterrence Redux: Science, Law and Causal Reasoning
on Capital Punishment, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 255, 277 (2006) (noting limited possibility of
deterrence among murder-suicides); see also BRYAN VOSSEKUIL, ROBERT A. FEIN, MARISA
REDDY, RANDY BORUM & WILLIAM MODZELESKI, THE FINAL REPORT AND FINDINGS OF THE
SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE 11, 21–22 (2004) (noting that seventy-eight percent of schoolhouse
attackers studied had attempted suicide or had suicidal thoughts before the attack).
5. See, e.g., Philip Rucker & Sari Horwitz, Newtown Seen as ‘Tipping Point’ for the
President, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2012, at A1 (discussing how the massacre of twenty
schoolchildren in Newtown by a shooter who then committed suicide spurred President Obama
to advocate for firearms regulation reform); Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on Gun
Violence on Jan. 30, 2013 (Transcript), WASH. POST, (Jan. 30, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-judiciary-committee-hearing-on-gun-violence
-on-jan-30-2013-transcript/2013/01/30/1f172222-6af5-11e2-af53-7b2b2a7510a8_story.html
[hereinafter Gun Violence Hearing Transcript] (unofficial transcript of What Should America
Do About Gun Violence?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013))
(discussing buildup of galvanizing firearms mass murders prompting legislative reform).
6. James Barron, Gunman Massacres 20 Children at School in Connecticut; 28 Dead,
Including Killer, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2012, at A1.
7. Tami Abdollah, For 6 Days, Fugitive Former Police Officer Hid Near Command
Post of Calif. Manhunt, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2013, at A13.
8. 159 CONG. REC. S6495–96 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2013) (statement of Sen. Richard
Blumenthal) (discussing how the mourning of the Newtown anniversary and the demise of
gun regulation was delayed because of the Senate closure due to the shooting blocks away);
see also Michael D. Shear & Michael S. Schmidt, 12 Shot to Death by Lone Gunman at a
Naval Base, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2013, at A1 (chronicling shootings).
9. Robin Abcarian, Jessica Garrison & Martha Groves, Gunman’s Troubled Past, L.A.
TIMES, June 11, 2013, at A1.
10. Katy Hall, Ethan Fedida & Jan Diehm, There Have Been More Mass Shootings
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have been at least 180 mass killings involving firearms—the weapon of choice in
more than seventy-five percent of mass killings, defined as homicides involving
four or more victims.11 In 2012, the most recent year for which national data is
available, firearms were involved in sixty-nine percent of all homicides.12
Many of the mass killings that have rocked the nation in recent years have a
commonality: they are homicide-suicides.13 Also referred to as dyadic death or
murder-suicide, homicide-suicides generally involve a two-stage act in which the
perpetrator kills one or more people and commits suicide shortly thereafter.14 The
interval between homicide and suicide is often brief—just twenty-four hours or
less—though some definitions include an interval of up to a week to be more
complete.15 Homicide-suicides are especially horrifying because they defy the usual
constraints on carnage, such as self-interest in avoiding detection or heightened
penalties for wreaking greater harm.16 Salient cases of homicide-suicide are so
branded into the national memory and discourse that they can be invoked with just
one or two words, becoming part of our national vocabulary of horror: Columbine,
Virginia Tech, Navy Yard, Newtown.17
The recent tragedies at Newtown and Navy Yard sparked efforts to pass new laws
shaped by the specter of the heavily armed, mentally disturbed mass killer.18
Since Newtown Than You’ve Heard About, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 17, 2013, 5:31 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/17/mass-shootings-2013_n_3941889.html.
11. Paul Overberg, Meghan Hoyer, Mark Hannan, Jodi Upton, Barbie Hansen & Erin
Durkin, Explore the Data on U.S. Mass Killings Since 2006, USA TODAY, Dec. 2, 2014,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/16/mass-killings-data-map/2820423/.
12. Criminal Justice Div., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Expanded Homicide Data Table
7: Murder, Types of Weapons Used, UNIFORM CRIME REP.: CRIME IN THE U.S. 2012,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/offenses
-known-to-law-enforcement/expanded-homicide/expanded_homicide_data_table_7_murder
_types_of_weapons_used_percent_distribution_by_region_2012.xls.
13. See, e.g., Petula Dvorak, Will These Deaths Be the Ones To Finally Force a New
Assault-Weapons Ban?, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2013, at A11 (discussing murder-suicides
that have galvanized the nation, from Virginia Tech to Newtown to Navy Yard); Andrew
Solomon, Op-Ed., Anatomy of a Murder-Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2012, at SR1
(discussing murder-suicides that have horrified the nation, from the Newtown shootings to
suicide bombers).
14. Marieke Liem, Catherine Barber, Nora Markwalder, Martin Killias & Paul
Nieuwbeerta, Homicide-Suicide and Other Violent Deaths: An International Comparison,
207 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 70, 70–71 (2011); Peter M. Marzuk, Kenneth Tardiff & Charles S.
Hirsch, The Epidemiology of Murder-Suicide, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3179, 3179–80 (1992).
15. Yekeen A. Aderibigbe, Violence in America: A Survey of Suicide Linked to
Homicides, 42 J. FORENSIC SCI. 662, 663 (1997). Compare Craig Campanelli & Thomas
Gilson, Murder-Suicide in New Hampshire, 1995–2000, 23 AM. J. FORENSIC MED.
& PATHOLOGY 248, 248–49 (2002) (up to one week), with Donna Cohen, Maria Llorente &
Carl Eisdorfer, Homicide-Suicide in Older Persons, 155 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 390 (1998)
(within twenty-four hours).
16. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
17. September 11—another homicide-suicide—has a similar economy of meaning in
our national vocabulary.
18. See, e.g., 159 CONG. REC. S6496 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2013) (statement of Sen.
Richard Blumenthal) (arguing for unity to pass new legislation after the Newtown and Navy
Yard mass shootings and urging, “Let us make a mental health initiative a centerpiece of this
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Proposed legislation in Congress would ban semiautomatic assault weapons and
high-capacity ammunition magazines, expand background checks, and raise penalties
for firearms crimes.19 Among the flurry of proposed state legislation in the year after
the Newtown killings, the most successful type of firearms restriction involved
restrictions and monitoring of people with mental and behavioral health issues.20 The
public also fixated on mental illness: according to a national Gallup poll, eighty
percent of Americans believed that the failure of the mental health system to identify
dangerous individuals is a “great deal” or “fair deal” to blame for mass shootings.21
The reinvigorated attention to firearms violence prevention is salutary and
important. In guiding both law and executive action, however, two important
empirical questions need to be addressed: (1) who are the dangerous individuals
that the law’s current screens miss and (2) why do the screens miss them? This
Article draws on data from the National Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS)
to answer the crucial questions of who poses a danger and why the dangerous slip
through current legal screens. This Article shows that prevention of both
extraordinary homicidal-suicidal violence and firearms homicides generally calls
for attention to how the nation addresses “ordinary” violence. By ordinary violence,
this Article means violence viewed as “normal” or mundane everyday altercations,
such as domestic disturbances or assaults, especially in the home among family
members, friends, and intimates.22
renewal and reinvigoration of our effort to stop gun violence.”); 159 CONG. REC. S288–89
(daily ed. Jan. 24, 2013) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (discussing mass shootings at Sandy
Hook; Aurora, Colorado; Virginia Tech; and Tucson, Arizona prompting legislation and that
the “common thread running through all of these shootings is that the gunman used a
semiautomatic assault weapon or large capacity ammunition magazine or drum”).
19. E.g., Fix Gun Checks Act of 2013, S. 374, 113th Cong. (2013) (expanding
background check requirement to private sellers); Gun Trafficking Prevention Act of 2013,
S. 179, 113th Cong. (2013) (criminalizing sale of firearms for prohibited purposes); Assault
Weapons Ban of 2013, H.R. 437, 113th Cong. (2013) (prohibiting the importation, sale,
manufacture, transfer, or possession of a semiautomatic assault weapon or large-capacity
ammunition-feeding device); Assault Weapons Ban of 2013, S. 150, 113th Cong. (2013)
(prohibiting the importation, sale, manufacturing, transfer, or possession of semiautomatic
assault weapons or large-capacity ammunition-feeding devices); Stop Illegal Trafficking in
Firearms Act of 2013, S. 54, 113th Cong. (2013) (directly criminalizing straw purchases of
firearms for prohibited persons or activities); Fix Gun Checks Act of 2013, H.R. 137, 113th
Cong. (2013) (expanding background checks to cover sales by private actors).
20. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 8100, 8105 (West 2014) (requiring
psychotherapists to report credible violent threats and extending the prohibition on firearms
ownership by persons making such threats to five years); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 330.20,
380.96 (McKinney 2014) (adding procedures restricting firearms possession by mentally ill
individuals and the certain criminally convicted individuals); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 573.001 (West 2014) (providing for firearms seizures from the mentally ill). For an
overview of the laws passed in the states since Newtown, see State Gun Laws Enacted in the
Year Since Newtown, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive
/2013/12/10/us/state-gun-laws-enacted-in-the-year-since-newtown.html [hereinafter State
Gun Laws Report].
21. Poll on Factors To Blame in Mass Shootings, GALLUP (Sept. 17–18, 2013),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx#2.
22. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 103-108, at 37–38 (1993) (discussing reluctance to intervene
in violence within the home); S. REP. NO. 102-197, at 35–46 (1991) (summarizing testimony
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While the current regulatory focus is on preventing violence from the armed
deranged stranger hunting in schools, businesses, and on the street, nearly half of
all incidents of firearms-related homicide take place in the home.23 The majority of
firearms homicides with known victim-perpetrator circumstances are perpetrated by
people the victim knew.24 Even when it comes to the seemingly most extreme form
of extraordinary violence—the homicidal-suicidal—the clearest warning signs
entail incidents of ordinary violence.25 This Article presents data revealing that a
substantial proportion of high-risk actors who go on to commit homicide-suicides
have a history of assaults and domestic disturbances but have never been in court.26
In contrast, a much smaller proportion of homicidal-suicidal shooters could have
been caught by focusing on mental-health red flags.27
Firearms possession laws prevent individuals convicted of crimes of domestic
violence or placed under court-issued restraining orders from possessing firearms.28 The
problem is that many perpetrators never come to the attention of a court.29 Based on
these findings regarding what current legal screens miss, this Article discusses how
executive action steering law enforcement procedures at the scenes of assaults can help
prevent seemingly “ordinary” violence from erupting into homicidal violence.
Passing new firearms laws is excruciatingly hard.30 For example, federal
firearms regulations stalled amid a fierce hailstorm of opposition by gun
proponents and the National Rifle Association (NRA) despite public support for
universal background checks and a sharp spike in support for stricter gun laws after
Newtown.31 Yet even the NRA is on record arguing that the government should
on trivialization of violence within the home); S. REP. NO. 101-545, at 31–34 (1990)
(documenting problems with neglect of familial violence); Joanne Belknap, Law
Enforcement Officers’ Attitudes About the Appropriate Responses to Woman Battering, 4
INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 47, 47–55 (1995) (finding tendency among law enforcement to
view claims of battered women as not credible, trivial, and unworthy of police time). For an
excellent history of normalization of the violence, see, e.g., Reva Siegel, “The Rule of
Love”: Wife Beating As Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2150–205 (1996).
23. For the data, see infra Part II.A, Table 2.
24. For the data, see infra Part II.A, Table 1 and note 93.
25. For a discussion, see infra Part II.
26. See infra Part II.C and Table 3.
27. See infra Part II.C and Table 4.
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), (8)–(9) (2012) (forbidding firearms possession by felons,
persons convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors, or persons subject to restraining
orders for harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner or child of an intimate
partner or other conduct putting the intimate partner in “reasonable fear of bodily injury”).
29. See infra Part II.C and Table 3.
30. For an account of the pitched warfare over attempts to regulate firearms, see, e.g.,
Philip J. Cook, The Great American Gun War: Notes from Four Decades in the Trenches, 42
CRIME & JUST. 19, 27–28 (2013). For a history, see, e.g., ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE
BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN AMERICA 253–58 (2011).
31. See, e.g., 159 CONG. REC. S7987 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2013) (statement of Sen. Chris
Murphy) (noting that for “6 months since the failure of our commonsense anti-gun violence
bill this spring” he has brought to the Senate floor a chart showing more deaths in hopes of
restarting debates); 159 CONG. REC. S291 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 2013) (statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein) (“Do we let the gun industry take over and dictate policy to this country?”);
Robert Draper, Inside the Power of the N.R.A., N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 12, 2013, at 48
(discussing the NRA’s role in blocking firearms legislation despite national momentum after
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focus on enforcing existing laws to disarm the dangerous, albeit focusing on the
mentally ill or violent criminals.32 This Article presents data regarding how to
define and screen for the dangerous and discusses how executive action regarding
scene of assault procedure can improve firearms violence prevention regardless of
whether new laws are added to the books.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the recent spate of gun
legislation and debates focused on extraordinary violence by a heavily armed,
mentally ill stranger hunting in public as the paradigm of danger. Part II presents
data from the NVDRS on perpetrator-victim relationship, place of death, and
perpetrator history in firearms homicides.
Countering the focus on the unhinged outsider, Part II shows that the main risk
factors and patterns of firearms homicides involve violence within the home by
people known to the slain. This Part also presents data showing that even in the
context of extraordinary violence by the homicidal-suicidal, the major early red
flags and risk factors involve seemingly ordinary smaller-scale assaults and
domestic disturbances. Perpetrators are very likely to have committed interpersonal
violence in the month before the homicide—yet never entered the legal system,
thereby evading current firearms-restrictions screens triggered by adjudications.33
Part III concludes by discussing how police practices in responding to seemingly
mundane ordinary violence can improve the law’s ability to identify and disarm the
potentially dangerous. This Part proposes a remedy that can be pursued as a matter
of executive action regardless of whether proposed new legislation falters in the
gauntlet of hurdles that beset attempts at firearms regulation.
I. THE HEAVILY ARMED, MENTALLY ILL PARADIGM
OF DANGER IN GUN LEGISLATION
The recent spate of proposals to reform firearms regulation are shaped by fears
of a mentally disturbed individual targeting public places such as schools, parking
lots, and workplaces.34 For legislators supporting more rigorous firearms
the Newtown and Navy Yard mass shootings); see also Americans Wanted Gun Background
Checks To Pass Senate, GALLUP (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/162083
/americans-wanted-gun-background-checks-pass-senate.aspx (showing that sixty-five
percent of Americans polled supported the universal background checks measure that did not
pass in the Senate); Poll on Public Opinion Regarding Strictness of Gun Laws, GALLUP
(Dec. 19–22, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx#1 (finding a sharp, albeit
ultimately temporary, spike in support for strict gun laws after the Newtown killings).
32. David Sherfinski, NRA Chief LaPierre: Enforce Existing Gun Laws, WASH. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 2012, at A1.
33. See infra Part II.C, Tables 3–5, and discussion at notes 131–135.
34. See, e.g., 159 Cong. Rec. S288–91 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 2013) (statement of Sen. Dianne
Feinstein) (invoking memory of mass shootings at Sandy Hook; Aurora, Colorado; Virginia Tech;
and Tucson, Arizona in presenting assault-weapons ban bill in the Senate); Gun Violence Hearing
Transcript, supra note 5 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (opening discussion of gun trafficking,
background checks, and assault-weapons ban bills by invoking the mass shootings at Newtown,
Aurora, Oak Creek, and Tucson and explaining the legislation is aimed at keeping “guns out of
the hands of those who will use them to commit mass murder”); Cruz Statement, supra note 2, at
1, 5 (inaugurating firearms legislation debates by invoking the memory of Newtown and
discussing bipartisan agreement that the mentally disordered should not have guns).
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regulation, the national shock over the Newtown mass shooting seemed like it
might be a tipping point.35 Shortly after school started at Sandy Hook Elementary
School on December 14, 2012, Adam Lanza shot his way into the school through
the plate glass panel next to the school’s locked front doors.36 Lanza, age twenty,
“was undoubtedly afflicted with mental health problems,” according to the people
who knew him. 37 That morning, Lanza had executed his mother with four shots to
the head before proceeding to the elementary school.38 He was heavily armed with
a Bushmaster rifle, Glock 20 10-mm pistol, Sig Sauer 9-mm pistol, and many
rounds of ammunition.39 In just about eleven minutes, Lanza murdered twenty
children and six adults, including the principal, a school psychologist, and multiple
school teachers and behavioral therapists.40 He then shot and killed himself. 41
The nation watched in horror as sobbing children evacuated, wounded people
and dead bodies emerged from the school, and frantic parents and teachers waited
in the parking lot.42 Inside the school, children were bleeding to death amid the
bodies of their already-dead classmates.43 Trying to escape impending death,
teachers had barricaded their students in their classrooms.44 There were scenes of
futile heroism in the tableau of fallen bodies, such as when a fifty-two-year-old
staff member tried to shield a student from gunfire with her body.45 Both died.46
Responding to a national outcry over the violence, President Obama released a
plan to reduce gun violence through a package of new laws introduced in 2013.47

35. Rucker & Horwitz, supra note 5.
36. STATE OF CONN., DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE STATE’S ATTORNEY FOR
THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF DANBURY ON THE SHOOTINGS AT SANDY HOOK ELEMENTARY SCHOOL
AND 36 YOGANANDA STREET, NEWTOWN, CONNECTICUT ON DECEMBER 14, 2012, at 5, 9 (2013)
[hereinafter CONNECTICUT STATE’S ATTORNEY’S FINDINGS ON SANDY HOOK SHOOTING].
37. Id. at 29.
38. Id. at 2, 27.
39. Id. at 9.
40. Id. at 5, 9–10.
41. Id. at 5.
42. See, e.g., James Barron, Pupils Were All Shot Multiple Times with a Semiautomatic,
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2012, at A1.
43. Ray Rivera, Reliving Horror and Faint Hope at Massacre Site, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2013, at A1.
44. Kenneth Garger & Laura Italiano, Time Has Not Healed Newtown’s Wounds, N.Y.
POST, Dec. 13, 2013, at A1.
45. CONNECTICUT STATE’S ATTORNEY’S FINDINGS ON SANDY HOOK SHOOTING, supra
note 36, at 10.
46. Id.
47. WHITE HOUSE, GUN VIOLENCE REDUCTION PLAN, supra note 1; see also Fix Gun
Checks Act of 2013, S. 374, 113th Cong. (2013) (expanding background checks requirement
to private sellers); Gun Trafficking Prevention Act of 2013, S. 179, 113th Cong. (2013)
(criminalizing sale of firearms for prohibited purposes); Assault Weapons Ban of 2013, H.R.
437, 113th Cong. (2013) (prohibiting the importation, sale, manufacture, transfer, or
possession of a semiautomatic assault weapon or large-capacity ammunition-feeding
device); Assault Weapons Ban of 2013, S. 150, 113th Cong. (2013) (prohibiting the
importation, sale, manufacturing, transfer, or possession of semiautomatic assault weapons
or large-capacity ammunition-feeding devices); Stop Illegal Trafficking in Firearms Act of
2013, S. 54, 113th Cong. (2013) (directly criminalizing straw purchases of firearms for

2015]

DISARMING THE DANGEROUS

159

The President’s three-pronged approach would (1) expand and improve background
checks of gun purchasers, (2) ban military-style assault weapons and high-capacity
ammunition magazines, and (3) heighten penalties for illegal firearms trafficking
while directly criminalizing the use of “straw purchasers” to buy guns for
prohibited persons or purposes.48 In addition, the President announced twenty-three
executive actions to improve enforcement and data sharing regarding mental-health
issues and other matters.49 The President also directed the Attorney General “to
review the laws governing who is prohibited from having guns and make
legislative and executive recommendations to ensure dangerous people aren’t
slipping through the cracks.”50
By presidential memorandum, Obama also lifted the freeze on funding for gun
violence research that had impoverished the gun debate of data.51 The freeze had
been in place since 1996, when Congress eliminated gun-violence research funds
from the budget of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and
added a rider that “none of the funds made available for injury prevention and
control at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention may be used to advocate
or promote gun control.”52 While the scope of the congressional limitation was
unclear, funding for gun violence research was effectively eliminated because
funding officials would not risk losing their jobs or budgets by testing the freeze’s
limits.53 President Obama’s presidential memorandum directed the CDC to fund
gun violence research, thereby removing some of the risk and doubt while
providing cover to open up funding.54
Change by executive action is swifter and surer than change by seeking new
laws—especially in the firearms context.55 Firearms regulation is a perilous area for
prohibited persons or activities); Fix Gun Checks Act of 2013, H.R. 137, 113th Cong. (2013)
(expanding background checks to cover sales by private actors).
48. WHITE HOUSE, GUN VIOLENCE REDUCTION PLAN, supra note 1, at 4–8.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 4–5.
51. Presidential Memorandum from the White House to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, Engaging in Public Health Research on the Causes and Prevention of Gun
Violence, 78 Fed. Reg. 4295 (Jan. 16, 2013); see also WHITE HOUSE, GUN VIOLENCE
REDUCTION PLAN, supra note 1, at 8 (discussing history of freeze); Arthur L. Kellermann &
Frederick P. Rivara, Silencing the Science on Gun Research, 309 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 549,
549–50 (2013) (discussing research consequences of the funding freeze).
52. Department of Health and Human Services Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No.
104-208, tit. II, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-244 (1996).
53. Kellermann & Rivara, supra note 51, at 549–50.
54. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat’l Institute of Health, NIH Calls for Research Projects
Examining Violence: Particular Consideration to Be Given to Firearm Violence (Sept. 27, 2013),
available at http://www.nih.gov/news/health/sep2013/nih-27.htm; Research on the Health
Determinants and Consequences of Violence and Its Prevention, Particularly Firearm Violence
(R01), Funding Opportunity Announcement Number PA-13-363, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS. (Sept. 27, 2013), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/pa-files/PA-13-363.html.
55. For a discussion of the use of executive action to achieve change despite legislative
inaction, see, e.g., Phillip J. Cooper, The Law: Presidential Memoranda and Executive
Orders: Of Patchwork Quilts, Trump Cards, and Shell Games, 31 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
126 (2001); Michael Sant’ Ambrogio, The Extra-Legislative Veto, 102 GEO. L.J. 351, 355–
56 (2014); Parker Rider-Longmaid, Comment, Take Care That the Laws Be Faithfully
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legislators to venture into because of deep cultural conflicts over the scope and
meaning of the right to bear arms.56 A gun is a powerful shape-shifting metaphor in
the patchwork of American cultures—a symbol of self-defense, self-sufficiency,
empowerment, and virility as well as an implement of mass violence, death, mortal
threat, and danger.57 Whether firearms regulation prevents violence or hinders
people in self-protection is also fiercely debated on the rhetorical, anecdotal, and
sometimes (despite the deprivation of research funding) empirical level.58
The scope of permissible regulation in light of the Second Amendment’s
guarantee of the right to bear arms is also contested and was narrowed after the
Supreme Court’s decisions in McDonald v. City of Chicago and District of
Columbia v. Heller.59 Addressing the more extreme pole of firearms restrictions,
McDonald and Heller invalidated near-absolute bans on handgun possession.60 As
with other constitutional rights, however, the Second Amendment is not absolute.61
The Court emphasized that the decisions did not put in doubt “longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms.”62
Because gun-control opponents tend to be rugged individualists who value
self-sufficiency and oppose government interference, attempts to enact federal
firearms restrictions are particularly fractious.63 An example comes from one of the
Litigated, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 291, 296–97 (2012); Jessica M. Stricklin, Comment, The Most
Dangerous Directive: The Rise of Presidential Memoranda in the Twenty-First Century as a
Legislative Shortcut, 88 TUL. L. REV. 397, 404–07 (2013).
56. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L REV. 115, 134–
36 (2007) (discussing rifts in worldviews from a cultural cognition perspective).
57. See, e.g., GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 82–85
(1997) (discussing cultural and regional meanings of guns).
58. See, e.g., DAVID HEMENWAY, PRIVATE GUNS, PUBLIC HEALTH 1203–81 (2004)
(discussing contested data and interpretations); Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting
Down the ‘More Guns, Less Crime’ Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1203–95 (2003)
(summarizing controversies and empirically evaluating the more guns, less violence claim).
59. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 790–91 (2010) (holding that there is a
Second Amendment right to possess a handgun in the home that applies in the states as well
as to the Federal Government); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29, 636
(2008) (invalidating a law that banned possessing a handgun in the home). For a sampling of
the vigorous debate on the scope of permissible regulation, see, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The
Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1164 (1991); Carl T. Bogus, The
History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A Primer, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 5–
8 (2000); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1574 (2009); cf. Joseph
Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 86 n.15 (2013) (describing the question of
whether the Second Amendment protects an individual right to gun ownership unconnected to
militia purposes as “long the central battle in Second Amendment law and scholarship”).
60. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3048 (holding that the City of Chicago’s ordinances
effectively banning firearms possession by most private citizens within the city violates the
Second Amendment); Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (holding that DC’s ban on firearms possession
within the home violates the Second Amendment).
61. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
62. Id. at 626–27; accord McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (plurality opinion).
63. Dan M. Kahan, The Gun Control Debate: A Culture-Theory Manifesto, 60 WASH.
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last major federal firearms restrictions enacted, the aging 1993 Brady Bill.64 The
Brady Bill required background checks on gun purchasers from commercial sellers,
who must be federally licensed.65 The NRA and other gun-control opponents
waged a fierce campaign to punish legislators who voted in favor of the Brady Bill,
ultimately shifting the balance of power in Congress from Democratic control to
Republican control.66 Because of such intense political difficulties, much of the
action in experimenting with firearms restrictions in recent years has been
piecemeal at the state level, despite the need for data sharing and uniformity to
improve screens for the dangerous.67
After Newtown, however, numerous firearms bills implementing the President’s
three-pronged plan were introduced in Congress.68 One form of legislation
introduced would extend the Brady Bill’s background check requirement to gun
shows and private, as well as commercial, gun sellers, thus closing a major gap in
screening purchasers.69 Another form of legislation heightened penalties for using
“straw purchasers” to illegally buy firearms for prohibited persons, such as felons,
or for prohibited purposes, such as to commit drug-trafficking crimes.70 The
legislation that sparked the most debate was an attempt to ban the sale,
manufacturing, and importation of military-style assault weapons and large-capacity
ammunition magazines, with exceptions for weapons used by military or law
enforcement officials.71 An earlier law, enacted around the time of the Brady Bill, had
imposed a partial assault-weapons ban, but the law sunset without renewal in 2004.72
& LEE L. REV. 3, 6 (2003).
64. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. 104-208, § 658, 110
Stat. 3009, 3009-371 to 3009-372 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–22, 925 (2012)).
65. Id.
66. See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 227–28 (2008) (providing history).
67. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1128 (2014);
Philip J. Cook, The Great American Gun War: Notes from Four Decades in the Trenches, 42
CRIME & JUST. 19, 27 (2013).
68. Fix Gun Checks Act of 2013, S. 374, 113th Cong. (2013) (expanding background
checks requirement to private sellers); Gun Trafficking Prevention Act of 2013, S. 179,
113th Cong. (2013) (criminalizing sale of firearms for prohibited purposes); Assault
Weapons Ban of 2013, H.R. 437, 113th Cong. (2013) (prohibiting the importation, sale,
manufacture, transfer, or possession of a semiautomatic assault weapon or large-capacity
ammunition-feeding device); Stop Illegal Trafficking in Firearms Act of 2013, S. 54, 113th
Cong. (2013) (directly criminalizing straw purchases of firearms for prohibited persons or
activities); Assault Weapons Ban of 2013, S. 150, 113th Cong. (2013) (prohibiting the
importation, sale, manufacturing, transfer, or possession of semiautomatic assault weapons
or large-capacity ammunition-feeding devices); Fix Gun Checks Act of 2013, H.R. 137,
113th Cong. (2013) (expanding background checks to cover sales by private actors).
69. Fix Gun Checks Act of 2013, S. 374, 113th Cong. (2013); Stop Illegal Trafficking in
Firearms Act of 2013, S. 54, 113th Cong. (2013); Gun Checks Act of 2013, H.R. 137, 113th
Cong. (2013).
70. Gun Trafficking Prevention Act of 2013, S. 179, 113th Cong. (2013).
71. Assault Weapons Ban of 2013, S. 150, 113th Cong. (2013).
72. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit.
XI, 108 Stat. 1796, 1996 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 921–22 (1994)); see also 159
CONG. REC. S289 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 2013) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (discussing
criticisms of the earlier assault-weapons ban); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Effort To Renew
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The bill’s cosponsor, Senator Levin, spoke about shootings in malls, movie
theaters, and schools, urging, “We must not wait for the next madman to easily and
legally purchase a military-style assault weapon and a high capacity magazine.”73
Introducing the assault-weapons bill on the Senate floor, Senator Feinstein invoked
the memory of the mass shootings in schools and movie theaters, stating, “Let me
say it as plainly as I can: weapons of war do not belong on our streets, in our
schools, in our malls, in our theaters, or in our workplaces. We know the common
denominator in these deadly massacres and these daily shootings: easy access to
killing machines designed for the battlefield.”74
Speaking for opponents, Senator Ted Cruz rebutted that the assault weapons
legislation merely banned “scary-looking guns” and was “ineffective show
legislation—sound and fury, signifying nothing.”75 Senator Cruz stated that the
focus should be on enforcing existing laws to keep guns out of the hands of the
dangerous—violent criminals and individuals with dangerous mental illnesses.76
Similarly, another opponent of the proposed firearms restrictions, Representative
Mike Rogers, argued the better discussion should be “[h]ow do we target people
with mental illness who use firearms?”77
Despite the deep fracture over whether new gun restriction laws are needed,
what is striking is the common paradigm of danger in the debates—a heavily
armed, mentally ill individual stalking public places. When evaluating risks and
danger, people tend to focus on emotion-laden salient events.78 By focusing on the
salient rather than prevalent risks, regulatory strategies become framed for the
high-horror event rather than harms that are more likely to occur.79 This tendency
to focus on salience rather than prevalence is a particular challenge when it comes
to firearms-violence prevention law and policy efforts because reform efforts are
often jolted into action by gripping horror stories.80 The deep divide over firearms
regulation intensifies this effect, driving reformers to use emotionally resonant
imagery to try to build a coalition for reform.81
Weapons Ban Falters on Hill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2004, at A1 (discussing how intense
lobbying by the NRA during an election year led to the demise of attempts to extend the
assault weapons ban).
73. 159 CONG. REC. S757–58 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2013) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin).
74. 159 CONG. REC. S288–91 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 2013) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein).
75. Cruz Statement, supra note 2, at 2.
76. Id.
77. Richard A. Friedman, In Gun Debate, a Misguided Focus on Mental Illness, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2012, at D5.
78. For an overview of the social psychology literature on salience and affect, see, e.g.,
Paul Slovic, Melissa L. Finucane, Ellen Peters & Donald G. MacGregor, Risk as Analysis
and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality, 24 RISK
ANALYSIS 311 (2004).
79. For a canonical statement of the problem in the regulatory arena, see, e.g. Cass R.
Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 62–70 (2002).
80. For a discussion, see, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Beyond Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The
Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 581, 627–30 (2012) (discussing how criminal-justice
legislation is jolted by tragedies and giving examples).
81. For discussions of the deep rift in cultural worldviews that polarize firearms debates,
see, e.g., WINKLER, supra note 30, at 8–14; Donald Braman & Dan M. Kahan, Overcoming the
Fear of Guns, the Fear of Gun Control, and the Fear of Cultural Politics: Constructing A Better
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This focus on the salient rather than prevalent source of danger may lead to
blind spots and missed opportunities for more achievable firearms-violence
prevention. Addressing blind spots, the next Part presents data on risk factors for
firearms violence in general and for the extraordinary violence of
homicide-suicides. Understanding the risk factors can also help identify dangers
that current and proposed regulations miss. The next Parts show, that potentially
dangerous actors slip through legal screens because a substantial amount of
violence that would trigger restrictions if adjudicated never makes it into the legal
system.
II. TO PREVENT EXTRAORDINARY VIOLENCE, FOCUS ON “ORDINARY” VIOLENCE
To effectively address firearms violence, it is important to understand
perpetration patterns and risk factors. Until the establishment of the National
Violent Death Reporting System (NVDRS) in 2003, an accurate national picture of
the context of firearms violence was difficult to attain because the nation lacked a
national violent-death surveillance system.82 In public-health parlance,
“surveillance” means systematic aggregation and dissemination of timely data to
people charged with protecting the nation’s health and safety.83 While the NVDRS
is not yet nationally representative, its approach of mining official reports from
contributing states is still a major advance.84 Recognizing the need for data-guided
violence-prevention efforts, the NVDRS compiles information from death
certificates, medical examiner or coroner records, law-enforcement records, and
crime-laboratory records in participating states.85 The most recent publicly
available data is from 2011and includes data from seventeen states.86
The collection of data permits a closer look at the circumstances surrounding
violent death, such as place of death and perpetrator-victim relationship. This
enables the identification of risk factors to improve the aim and focus of law and
policy crafted in hopes of preventing firearms violence. NVDRS data can also be
supplemented with information from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) and
the CDC’s Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System
(WISQARS).87 FBI data comes from more than 18,000 law-enforcement agencies
voluntarily participating in the crime-reporting program.88 WISQARS fatal-injury
Gun Debate, 55 EMORY L.J. 569, 570–72, 577–87 (2006); Kahan, supra note 63, at 4–10.
82. Liem et al., supra note 14, at 70–71.
83. See, e.g., Stephen B. Thacker, Historical Development, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
OF PUBLIC HEALTH SURVEILLANCE 1, 1–8 (2d ed. 2000).
84. See Catherine W. Barber, Deborah Azrael, David Hemenway, Lenora M. Olson,
Carrie Nie, Judy Schaechter & Sabrina Walsh, Suicides and Suicide Attempts Following
Homicide: Victim-Suspect Relationship, Weapon Type, and Presence of Antidepressants, 12
HOMICIDE STUD. 285, 286–87 (2008) (discussing the genesis and utility of the NVDRS).
85. L. J. Paulozzi, J. Mercy, L. Frazier Jr. & J. L. Annest, CDC’s National Violent
Death Reporting System: Background and Methodology, 10 INJ. PREVENTION 47, 49 (2004).
86. National Violent Death Reporting System Information, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov
/violenceprevention/nvdrs/.
87. Uniform Crime Reports, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about
-us/cjis/ucr/ucr; Injury Prevention & Control: Data & Statistics (WISQARS), CDC,
http://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/index.html.
88. Uniform Crime Reports, supra note 87.
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data comes from death certificates reported to the National Vital Statistics
System.89 WISQARS nonfatal-injury data comes from reports by U.S. hospitals and
emergency departments submitted to the National Electronic Injury Surveillance
System.90 Both data sources have the advantage of national coverage but the
disadvantage of less finely grained detail than data offered through the NVDRS.
The richest nationally based source of data is from the FBI’s National
Incident-Based Reporting System, which includes information on victim-offender
relationships and crime locations by crime category, albeit not by weapon type.91
The Parts below present data from the NVDRS contextualizing firearms violence,
supplemented with WISQARS and FBI data.
A. Firearms Violence at Home, Among Family and Friends
While recent firearms-restrictions legislation and debates have focused on
violence from deranged strangers hunting in public, NVDRS data reveals that
firearms homicides tend to take place at home, among friends and family. Table 1
presents data on the victim-perpetrator relationship in firearms homicides from
2011, the most recently available year, from seventeen NVDRS states.92 The
victim-perpetrator relationship data was derived from examining all cases with
known circumstances of homicide by each perpetrator relationship type, and in
combination.
Table 1. Victim-perpetrator relationship, firearms homicides, seventeen NVDRS states, 2011

Family or intimates
Intimate of relative
Friends or acquaintances
Strangers, gang members
Other relationships
Shot by law enforcement
Relationship unknown
Total

Count

Percent (%)*

406

21

13
331
191
255
34
714
1944

0.6
17
10
13
2
37
100

89. Injury Prevention & Control: Data & Statistics (WISQARS), supra note 87.
90. Id.
91. Uniform Crime Reports Publications, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr-publications.
92. Currently, there are eighteen participating NVDRS states: Alaska, Colorado,
Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and
Wisconsin. By 2011, the most recently available data year, seventeen of the eighteen states
had the capacity to contribute information. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, DIV. OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION
& CONTROL, LINKING DATA TO SAVE LIVES (2013), available at http://www.cdc.gov
/violenceprevention/pdf/nvdrstimeline-a.pdf; State by State, NAT’L VIOLENCE PREVENTION
NETWORK, http://www.preventviolence.net/statebystate/statebystate.html.
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*

Victim-perpetrator relationship classification is available for 1944 of 2975 homicides by
firearms in the seventeen NVDRS states with data publicly accessible in 2011. The
denominator for the proportion is the 1944 deaths for which classification is available.

As summarized in Table 1, killings by family, intimates, friends, or
acquaintances accounted for at least 38% of all the firearms homicides in the
seventeen NVDRS states for which victim-perpetrator relationship was categorized.
This number likely underreports the proportion of firearms homicides by family,
intimates, friends, or acquaintances because it does not include the 37% of cases
where the relationship is categorized as unknown. Relationships are listed as
unknown if the suspected perpetrator relationship has not been listed in reports.
Such missing data is likely due to either differences in data-reporting practices or
pending investigations. If cases where the relationship is unknown are excluded
from the denominator, the proportion of firearms homicides by family, intimates,
friends, or acquaintances rises to 61% of all the homicides by firearm for which
victim-perpetrator relationship is categorized.93
Table 2 presents data on the place of firearms homicide by all relationship types
based on NVDRS data. As summarized below, nearly half of all firearms-related
homicides in the seventeen NVDRS states occurred in the home.
Table 2. Place of firearms homicides, seventeen NVDRS states, 2011

Home*
Highway, street, road
Other transportation†
Recreational area
Commercial area
Natural area
Other‡
Unknown
Total

Count

Percent (%)

1429
754
302
32
217
52
91
95
2975§

48
25
10
1
7
2
3
3
100

*

Includes house or apartment and the curtilage (driveway, porch, or yard) as well the interior
of the home
†
Includes the interior of motor vehicles
‡
Other specified places, including schools, sports fields, or athletics arenas
§
The total equals 2975 rather than 2972 because it includes the numbers of deaths in
residential institutions, including a shelter or prison, which are suppressed in NVDRS lineitem reporting because they are fewer than ten.

Indeed, the adage “[h]ome is [w]here the [v]iolence [i]s”94 proves to be true
among violent-crime cases generally. National FBI data shows that 63% of all

93. The precise figure is obtained from dividing the 750 firearms homicides by friends,
intimates, family, or acquaintances by the 1230 deaths where relationship information is
reported, excluding the category where the relationship is categorized as unknown, yielding
61%. See supra Table 1.
94. JEANNINE BELL, HATE THY NEIGHBOR: MOVE-IN VIOLENCE AND THE PERSISTENCE OF
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crimes against persons in 2012, including assaults, homicides, abductions, and sex
offenses, occurred in a home or residence.95 Among assaults, 62% occurred in a
home or residence.96 Among homicides, 55% occurred in a home or residence.97
Nationally, between 2008 and 2012, firearms were used in about 68% of all
homicides.98 While much debate has centered on military-style assault weapons, the
main type of firearm used in homicide between 2008 and 2012 was the less lurid
but nonetheless deadly handgun.99 Among firearms homicides, 71% of the killings
were committed using a handgun.100 In 2012, the most frequently recorded known
circumstance involved in a homicide by firearm was an argument.101
The data and discussion presented thus far has focused on firearms-related
violence generally. As discussed in Part I, a motivating concern in the recent spate
of firearms legislation has been a particular form of extraordinary firearms
violence—mass killings, often by a homicidal-suicidal perpetrator.102 The NVDRS
provides an even closer look at the risk factors for homicide-suicides, one form of
extraordinary violence, because data on the history of persons who commit suicide
are also collected. The next Parts present data showing that even when it comes to
the extraordinary violence of homicide-suicides, the risk factors and prior history of
perpetrators involve seemingly mundane “ordinary” violence and disputes. Many
of these altercations never make it into the criminal-justice system, thus evading
existing screens for removing firearms from people convicted of certain offenses.
B. Rare but Devastating Harm: Homicide-Suicide
Newtown, Navy Yard, Virginia Tech, Santa Monica College—these site names
that turned into shorthand for mass killings share a commonality. All of these mass
shootings and many other mass killings that have shocked the nation into concern
over firearms violence prevention involve homicide-suicides.103 Homicide-suicides
RACIAL SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN HOUSING 4 (2013) (illustrating adage in the context of
move-in violence).
95. See Crimes Against Persons Offenses: Offense Category by Location, 2012, FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/nibrs/2012/table-pdfs
/crimes-against-persons-offenses-offense-category-by-location-2012 (giving offense counts;
percentages are calculated from the counts).
96. See id. (giving offense counts; percentages are calculated from the counts).
97. See id. (giving offense counts; percentages are calculated from the counts).
98. See Uniform Crime Reports, Expanded Homicide Data Table 8, Murder Victims by
Weapon, 2008-2012, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr
/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/offenses-known-to-law-enforcement/expanded
-homicide/expanded_homicide_data_table_8_murder_victims_by_weapon_2008-2012.xls
(providing counts of weapons used in homicides; percentages are calculated from the counts).
99. Id.
100. See id. (providing counts; percentages are calculated from the counts).
101. See Uniform Crime Reports, Expanded Homicide Data Table 11, Murder
Circumstances
by
Weapon,
2012,
FED.
BUREAU
OF
INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.-2012/offenses
-known-to-law-enforcement/expanded-homicide/expanded_homicide_data_table_11_murder
_circumstances_by_weapon_2012.xls (providing counts by circumstances and weapon type).
102. See supra notes 1–17, 34–46 and accompanying text.
103. Id.
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strike particular fear because criminal law’s traditional artillery for deterring crime,
such as higher penalties for causing more harm, are immaterial to someone who
plans on dying after killing others.104 Perpetrators who kill multiple people rather
than one expose themselves to heavier penalties, including the death penalty, in
many jurisdictions.105 But someone who thinks he will die tomorrow only goes out
in a greater blaze of fame and glory—a motivation among many rampage
shooters—if more people are killed.106
Despite salient events that may lead to overestimation of probability,
homicide-suicide rates have been low and generally stable over time.107 Estimates
of homicide-suicide prevalence in the United States vary, ranging from 0.2 per
100,000 up to 0.5 per 100,000 of the population.108 In the United States,
homicide-suicides constitute about 5–6% of homicides.109 Homicide-suicides claim
an estimated 1000 to 1500 American lives per year, averaging about twenty to
thirty violent deaths per week.110 The homicide-suicide mortality figure is similar to

104. See, e.g., Dill et al., supra note 4, at 114 (“For those youth who have decided to kill
themselves as part of their attack, deterrence may seem moot.”); Fagan, supra note 4, at 277
(noting limited possibility of deterrence among murder-suicides); see also VOSSEKUIL ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 22 (noting that 78% of schoolhouse attackers studied had considered or
attempted suicide).
105. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(10) (2005) (defining murder “wherein two or
more persons are murdered by the defendant” as a capital offense); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-5401(6) (Supp. 2013) (defining “intentional and premeditated killing of more than one
person” as a ground for capital murder); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(7) (2014) (defining the
“willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of more than one person as a part of the same
act or transaction”).
106. See, e.g., Roger W. Byard, Murder-Suicide, 3 FORENSIC PATHOLOGY REV. 337, 343
(2005) (discussing “blaze-of-glory” as a type of motivation among murder-suicides); Adam
Lankford & Nayab Hakim, From Columbine to Palestine: A Comparative Analysis of
Rampage Shooters in the United States and Volunteer Suicide Bombers in the Middle East,
16 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 98, 99, 105 (2011) (discussing fame and glory as a
motivation among many rampage shooters).
107. Scott Eliason, Murder-Suicide: A Review of the Recent Literature, 37 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 371, 371–73 (2009).
108. E.g., R. M. Bossarte, T. R. Simon & L. Barker, Characteristics of Homicide
Followed by Suicide Incidents in Multiple States, 2003–04, 12 INJURY PREVENTION ii33, ii33,
ii35 (2006) (noting prevalence estimates of between 0.2 and 0.38 per 100,000 persons
annually and reporting homicide rate due to homicide-suicide of 0.238 per 100,000 persons
in 2004); F. Stephen Bridges & David Lester, Homicide-Suicide in the United States, 1968–
1975, 206 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 185, 185–86 (2011) (noting reports of between 0.2 to 0.38
per 100,000 persons and finding 0.134 per 100,000 persons per year between 1968 to 1975);
Julie E. Malphurs & Donna Cohen, A Newspaper Surveillance Study of Homicide-Suicide in
the United States, 23 AM. J. FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 142, 142–43 (2002) (noting
reports of between 0.2 to 0.3 per 100,000 persons and up to 0.4 to 0.5 per 100,000 persons).
109. Barber et al., supra note 84, at 286.
110. Id. at 285; Liem et al., supra note 14, at 70–71; J. Logan, Holly A. Hill, Michele Lynberg
Black, Alex E. Crosby, Debra L. Karch, Jamar D. Barnes & Keri M. Lubell, Characteristics of
Perpetrators in Homicide-Followed-by-Suicide Incidents: National Violent Death Reporting
System—17 US States, 2003–2005, 168 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1056, 1056 (2008).
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the numbers of American lives lost due to afflictions such as tuberculosis, viral
hepatitis, Hodgkin’s lymphoma, influenza, or meningitis.111
The incidence rates seem to suggest that homicide-suicide is a relatively rare,
aberrant event. Yet the impact of homicide-suicides has been devastating for
communities
and
individuals
with
long-term
traumatic
effects.112
Homicide-suicides are more likely than general homicides to involve multiple
victims.113 Firearms are even more likely to be used in homicide-suicides than
homicides in general—89% compared to 65% according to one estimate.114 The
United States has higher homicide-suicide rates than peer countries such as
England and Wales, the Netherlands, and Switzerland.115 This may be due in part to
the readier availability of firearms in the United States.116
While research into the treatment of diseases with similar mortality rates as
homicide-suicides is advanced, homicide-suicide prevention research is in the
earlier stage of assessing the scope of the problem.117 What is known from
homicide-suicide research to date is that this extreme form of violence particularly
impacts women and children.118 In contrast, homicides generally disproportionately
impact adult men because of the predominance of male-on-male violence resulting
in homicide.119 The vast majority of homicide-suicides are “family affairs”
involving killings of family members.120 Studies indicate that 42–69% of homicidesuicides involve intimate partners, 18–47% involve familicide or filicide, and 12–
26% involve extrafamilial homicide.121 Thus, like firearms violence generally, most
homicide-suicides are perpetrated by family and intimates.
Prior studies have found that intimate-partner conflict and domestic-violence
history are major risk factors for homicide-suicides.122 Several studies indicate that
the typical perpetrator of homicide-suicide is male, married, and a domestic

111. Barber et al., supra note 84, at 285; Liem et al., supra note 14, at 70–71; Marzuk et
al., supra note 14, at 3179.
112. Barber et al., supra note 84, at 285; Logan et al., supra note 110, at 1056.
113. Liem et al., supra note 14, at 70–75.
114. Bridges & Lester, supra note 108, at 186.
115. Id. at 186–87 (nearly double the rate of England and Wales).
116. Id. at 188.
117. See, e.g., Aderibigbe, supra note 15, at 662–63 (discussing “severely limited”
research on murder-suicides, in part for lack of a national surveillance system); Liem et al.,
supra note 14, at 70–71 (discussing challenges in studying homicide-suicide of small and
geographically limited sample sets).
118. Liem et al., supra note 14, at 70–73; accord Bridges & Lester, supra note 108, at 186.
119. See, e.g., Janet L. Lauritsen & Karen Heimer, The Gender Gap in Violent
Victimization, 1973–2004, 24 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 125, 133 fig.1 (2008)
(graphing disparity in violence victimization between genders).
120. Bridges & Lester, supra note 108, at 186–87.
121. Logan et al., supra note 110, at 1056.
122. Mary Cooper & Derek Eaves, Suicide Following Homicide in the Family, 11
VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 99 (1996); Jane Koziol-McLain, Daniel Webster, Judith McFarlane,
Carolyn Rebecca Block, Yvonne Ulrich, Nancy Glass & Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Risk
Factors for Femicide-Suicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a Multisite Case
Control Study, 21 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 3 (2006); Logan et al., supra note 110.
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abuser.123 Even perpetrators of suicide-homicides involving nonpartners frequently
had a history of intimate-partner conflicts.124 A woman ending a relationship with a
man may be at heightened risk for being the victim of a homicide-suicide by her
former partner.125 These findings are consistent with studies finding separation to
be a risk factor for lethal violence, and a heightened risk of violence among
separated women.126 Studies have posited that pathological possessiveness and
proprietariness, particularly over a woman attempting to leave, may give rise to the
extraordinary violence of homicide-suicide.127
Existing federal law already prohibits individuals convicted of domestic
violence or under a restraining order protecting an intimate partner or child from
possessing firearms.128 The 1996 Lautenberg Amendment added the specific
prohibition on individuals convicted of a state or federal domestic-violence
misdemeanor from possessing firearms.129 In addition, many state laws also have
similar or broader prohibitions on firearms possession by individuals convicted of
domestic violence offenses or under a permanent restraining order.130
The nation has democratically agreed that batterers should not be armed because
of the risk of escalation of violence to homicide. So what is the problem? The next

123. E.g., Aderibigbe, supra note 15, at 663; Barber et al., supra note 84, at 290–92;
Liem et al., supra note 14, at 70–76; Logan et al., supra note 110, at 1058–60.
124. Logan et al., supra note 110, at 1060, 1062.
125. Aderibigbe, supra note 15, at 663; Eliason, supra note 107, at 371–73;
Koziol-McLain et al., supra note 122, at 8, 15 tbl.2; Marzuk et al., supra note 14, at 3180.
126. E.g., Douglas A. Brownridge, Ko Ling Chan, Diane Hiebert-Murphy, Janice
Ristock, Agnes Tiwari, Wing-Cheong Leung & Susy C. Santos, The Elevated Risk for
Non-Lethal Post-Separation Violence in Canada: A Comparison of Separated, Divorced,
and Married Women, 23 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 117 (2008); Douglas A. Brownridge,
Violence Against Women Post-Separation, 11 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 514
(2006); Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Daniel Webster, Jane Koziol McLain, Carolyn Block, Doris
Campbell, Mary Ann Curry, Faye Gary, Nancy Glass, Judith McFarlane, Carolyn Sachs,
Phyllis Sharps, Yvonne Ulrich, Susan A. Wilt, Jennifer Manganello, Xiao Xu, Janet
Schollenberger, Victoria Frye & Kathryn Laughon, Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive
Relationships: Results from a Multi-Site Case Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089
(2003); Ruth M. Fleury, Cris M. Sullivan & Deborah I. Bybee, When Ending the
Relationship Does Not End the Violence: Women’s Experiences of Violence by Former
Partners, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1363 (2000); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11, 63–64 (1991);
Judith M. McFarlane, Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Susan Wilt, Carolyn J. Sachs, Yvonne Ulrich
& Xiao Xu, Stalking and Intimate Partner Femicide, 3 HOMICIDE STUD. 300 (1999).
127. Campanelli & Gilson, supra note 15; Cooper & Eaves, supra note 122, at 99–112;
M. Rosenbaum, The Role of Depression in Couples Involved in Murder-Suicide and
Homicide, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1036 (1990).
128. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–22, 925 (2012).
129. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 658, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-371 to 3009-372 (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 921–22, 925 (2012)). A qualifying domestic violence offense must involve use or
attempted use of physical force or threatened use of a deadly weapon against an intimate
partner. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33) (2012).
130. For a summary, see Elizabeth Richardson Vigdor & James A. Mercy, Do Laws
Restricting Access to Firearms by Domestic Violence Offenders Prevent Intimate Partner
Homicide?, 30 EVAL. REV. 313, 317–20 (2006).
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subpart examines recent NVDRS data regarding the prior history of perpetrators of
homicide-suicides to assess why high-risk persons may be slipping through the
system’s screens.
C. Unadjudicated Assaults: Risk Factors That Current Legal Screens Miss
To explore risk factors, this Article examines homicide-suicide data from
NVDRS states between 2005–11. The time period from 2005 onward was chosen
because the last major survey of NVDRS homicide-suicide data was for the years
2003–05.131 The number of reporting states with publicly available information
changed from sixteen to seventeen states between 2005–10 and 2011. For
consistency of states over time, the data for the sixteen states that reported between
2005 and 2010 is shown for 2011. Table 3 shows that in these states, between 53%
and 85% of persons suspected of a recent homicide-suicide had perpetrated
interpersonal violence in the past month before escalating to their final killing. Yet
despite high percentages of perpetration of interpersonal violence in the month
before the homicide-suicide, the rates of criminal legal system contacts are much
lower, at between 12% and 22%. The data suggests that red-flag violence is
slipping through the cracks—coming to light too late during police investigations
or coroner’s inquests into a death that might have been prevented.
Table 3. Prevalence of interpersonal violence history and legal system contacts among
homicide-suicide perpetrators, sixteen NVDRS states, 2005–11

Persons with known
circumstances

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

165

142

135

133

157

166

167

99
(60%)

89
(53%)

Past history of violence
Perpetrated interpersonal
violence in past month

140
(85%)

110
(77%)

104
(77%)

88
(66%)

93
(59%)

Legal system contacts
Recent criminal legal
problem

30
(18%)

31
(22%)

26
(19%)

16
(12%)

35
(22%)

34
(20%)

29
(17%)

Other legal problems

11
(7%)

–*

–*

–*

–*

–*

12
(7%)

*

Because the number of deaths was five or fewer, the number was suppressed to retain
confidentiality.
†
In 2011, the number of states for which data was publicly available changed from sixteen to
seventeen. For consistency, this table reports data from the sixteen states for which data is
also available from 2005–10.

The publicly available NVDRS data for perpetration of interpersonal violence
does not separately report what percentage was domestic violence. Inferences can

131. Logan et al., supra note 110, at 1057.
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be made based on the data regarding the perpetrators’ history of problems prior to
the killing. Table 4 summarizes perpetrator problem histories. Between 71% and
81% of homicide-suicide perpetrators during this period had a history of
intimate-partner problems. In contrast, far fewer had a history of job, financial,
other relationship, school, or physical health problems.
Table 4. History of problems by type and percentage among homicide-suicide perpetrators,
NVDRS states, 2005–11

Persons with known
circumstances

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011†

165

142

135

133

157

166

167

Intimate partner
problem

133
(81%)

106
(75%)

109
(81%)

95
(71%)

118
(75%)

119
(72%)

127
(76%)

Crisis in two weeks
before killing

146
(88%)

127
(89%)

123
(91%)

115
(86%)

121
(77%)

120
(72%)

108
(65%)

Other relationship
problem

18
(11%)

16
(11%)

16
(12%)

23
(17%)

23
(15%)

31
(19%)

21
(13%)

Job problem

10
(6%)

–*

–*

11
(8%)

–*

–*

16
(10%)

Financial problem

16
(10%)

13
(9%)

–*

–*

18
(11%)

12
(7%)

15
(9%)

School problem

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

–*

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

0
(0%)

Physical health
problem

18
(11%)

8
(5%)

–*

–*

15
(10%)

10
(6%)

14
(8%)

*
Because the number of deaths was five or fewer, the number was suppressed to retain
confidentiality.
†
In 2011, the number of states for which data was publicly available changed from sixteen to
seventeen. For consistency, this table reports data from the sixteen states for which data is
also available from 2005–10.

As for mental-health issues, strikingly few of the homicide-suicide perpetrators
had ever been treated for a mental problem or had a current mental health problem.
Table 5 summarizes known mental-health circumstances of perpetrators. Only a
small fraction of the perpetrators had ever been treated for mental health illness—
ranging from a yearly count too low to report to a high of just 15% of the homicidesuicide perpetrators that year. Only a similarly small proportion of perpetrators
were known to have had a current mental-health problem. If mental-health
problems were used as the definition of the dangerous, the data indicates the
criterion would miss the vast majority of perpetrators who escalate to
homicide-suicide. Of course, mental-health issues may fester unidentified in some
cases. This low prevalence of a known history of mental-health issues in
homicide-suicide perpetrators is precisely why mental-health issues are a
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substantially less suitable screen for the dangerous than the much more prevalent
known circumstance of perpetration of interpersonal violence.132
Table 5. Mental health history among homicide-suicide perpetrators, NVDRS states, 2005–
11
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011†

165

142

135

133

157

166

167

Current depressed
mood

32
(19%)

18
(13%)

10
(7%)

17
(13%)

19
(12%)

24
(14%)

26
(16%)

Current mental
health problem

26
(16%)

–*

–*

18
(14%)

24
(15%)

23
(14%)

22
(13%)

Current treatment
for mental illness

15
(9%)

–*

–*

13
(10%)

15
(10%)

21
(13%)

13
(8%)

Ever treated for
mental problem

21
(13%)

–*

–*

17
(13%)

20
(13%)

25
(15%)

17
(10%)

Disclosed intent to
commit suicide

28
(17%)

14
(10%)

–*

13
(10%)

19
(12%)

19
(11%)

28
(17%)

History of suicide
attempts

–*

–*

–*

–*

–*

–*

–*

*

*

*

*

13
(8%)

13
(8%)

14
(8%)

–*

15
(9%)

16
(10%)

Persons with known
circumstances

Alcohol dependence
Other substance
problems

–

11
(7%)

–

–*

–

10
(7%)

–

–*

*

Because the number of deaths was five or fewer, the number was suppressed to retain
confidentiality.
†
In 2011, the number of states for which data was publicly available changed from sixteen to
seventeen, resulting in higher counts. The proportions of the total are still informative.

In sum, the data on perpetrator history summarized in Tables 3–5 above
suggests that the perpetration of interpersonal violence and intimate-partner
relationship problems are major risk factors among homicide-suicide perpetrators.
As discussed in Part II.B, existing federal and state laws already reflect the
democratic decision to disarm high-risk perpetrators of intimate-partner violence.133
As the data on perpetrator history reveals, the problem is that a substantial number
of perpetrators who committed interpersonal violence in the month before
escalating to homicide-suicide had apparently not entered into the criminal legal
system. The prior violence does not come to light until too late, in police
investigations or coroners’ inquests into a homicide. Without a conviction or at
least a protection order, potentially dangerous individuals evade legal screens
meant to disarm the dangerous.

132. See supra Table 3 and accompanying text.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 128–30.
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III. PREVENTING FIREARMS VIOLENCE THROUGH
SCENE OF THE ASSAULT PROCEDURE
This Article’s main aims were to determine the characteristics of potentially
dangerous individuals who firearms-restrictions laws should be catching and why
those individuals may be evading current legal screens. The data in Part II showed
that though the paradigm of danger in current gun-restriction debates is a heavily
armed, mentally ill stranger hunting in public, most firearms deaths are perpetrated
at home by people the victim knows. The most prevalent risk factors are
perpetration of interpersonal violence in the past month and intimate-partner
relationship problems.134 As Table 3 showed, a major reason why dangerous
perpetrators evade current legal screens is that cases of interpersonal violence never
make it into the legal system. This concluding Part proffers a potential way to
address the problem through executive action rather than entering a bristling
political minefield to seek new laws.
The drive for new laws has proved difficult—even perilous. Attempts to pass
federal legislation have faltered in Congress after fierce campaigns with influential
interventions by the National Rifle Association (NRA).135 Many state efforts also
stalled—and backlash led to loosening firearms restrictions in several states.136
Moreover, the majority of Americans have preferred stricter enforcement of existing
laws rather than passing new gun laws in every national Gallup poll since the
question has been posed, beginning in 2000 and continuing until 2013—when
support for passing new gun laws spiked to a record high of forty-seven percent after
a spate of mass shootings.137 Thus, this proposal focuses on executive action steering
enforcement discretion at the scene of an assault rather than enacting more laws.
Despite revolutionary reforms to try to improve responses to assaults within the
family in recent decades, many cases never proceed because of underreporting and
victim reluctance.138 Policies that mandate proceeding even if victims refuse to
cooperate have proved immensely controversial, beset with allegations of coercing
victims and exposing them to more violence.139 In many cases, the only chance law

134. See supra Table 3.
135. Ed O’Keefe & Philip Rucker, Gun-Control Overhaul Is Defeated in Senate, WASH.
POST, Apr. 17, 2013, at A1.
136. See, e.g., State Gun Laws Report, supra note 20 (reporting in the year after
Newtown, seventy of the 109 state firearms laws passed—sixty-four percent—loosened
rather than tightened restrictions, often in backlash to proposed federal regulations, and only
thirty-six percent of legislation successfully passed in the states tightened restrictions); Jack
Healy, Colorado Lawmakers Ousted in Recall Vote Over Gun Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
2013, at A1 (reporting that two legislators in Colorado—site of two infamous mass shootings—
who passed new firearms laws lost their jobs after a recall campaign bolstered by the NRA).
137. Lydia Saad, Americans Want Stricter Gun Laws, Still Oppose Bans, GALLUP (Dec. 27,
2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/159569/americans-stricter-gun-laws-oppose-bans.aspx.
138. See, e.g., David Hierschel & Ira W. Hutchison, The Relative Effects of Offense,
Offender, and Victim Variables on the Decision to Prosecute Domestic Violence Cases, 7
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 46, 47–49, 51–55 (2001) (discussing policies to try to improve
criminal-justice enforcement in the domestic-violence context and continuing barriers to
prosecution, including victim reluctance to proceed).
139. See, e.g., David A. Ford, Coercing Victim Participation in Domestic Violence
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enforcement has to intervene in a case of assault by someone familiar to the victim
is when responding to an emergency call to stop the immediate assault.140
There is a strong body of scholarship on how to improve procedures for
disarming batterers after a legal-system intervention, such as the issuance of a
protective order or criminal conviction.141 But what happens if a perpetrator of
interpersonal violence never makes it into the legal system, as the data presented in
Part II revealed is a problem among those who escalate to homicide-suicide? The best
alternative intervention point is during the police response to the emergency call.
But what should police do? One idea that some states have explored is to allow
police to confiscate firearms at the scene of a domestic-violence assault.142 At least

Prosecutions, 18 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 669, 669–70 (2003); Cheryl Hanna, No Right
to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 1849, 1865–97 (2006).
140. Cf. Carolyn Hoyle & Andrew Sanders, Police Response to Domestic Violence: From
Victim Choice to Victim Empowerment?, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 14, 22–23 (2000)
(discussing interviews with British victims of domestic violence; a majority of whom called
police to stop the violence but did not want an arrest); Mary Beth Phelan, L. Kevin Hamberger,
Clare E. Guse, Shauna Edwards, Suzanne Walczak & Amy Zosel, Domestic Violence Among
Male and Female Patients Seeking Emergency Medical Services, 20 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 187,
195 (2005) (discussing survey about calling the police in response to violence).
141. E.g., Emily J. Sack, Confronting the Issue of Gun Seizure in Domestic Violence
Cases, 6 J. CENTER FOR FAM., CHILD. & CTS. 3 (2005); Katherine A. Vittes, Daniel W.
Webster, Shannon Frattaroli, Barbara E. Claire & Garen J. Wintemute, Removing Guns from
Batterers: Findings from a Pilot Survey of Domestic Violence Restraining Order Recipients
in California, 19 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 602 (2013); Daniel W. Webster, Shannon
Frattaroli, Jon S. Vernick, Chris O’Sullivan, Janice Roehl & Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Women
with Protective Orders Report Failure to Remove Firearms from their Abusive Partners:
Results from an Exploratory Study, 19 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 93 (2010).
142. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(C) (2010) (“A peace officer may
question the persons who are present to determine if a firearm is present on the premises. On
learning or observing that a firearm is present on the premises, the peace officer may
temporarily seize the firearm if the firearm is in plain view or was found pursuant to a
consent to search and if the officer reasonably believes that the firearm would expose the
victim or another person in the household to a risk of serious bodily injury or death.”); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 13730(c)(3) (West 2010) (“Any firearm or other deadly weapon discovered
by an officer at the scene of a domestic violence incident shall be subject to
confiscation . . . .”); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 134-7.5(a) (West 2008) (“Any police officer
who has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has recently assaulted or threatened to
assault a family or household member may seize all firearms and ammunition that the police
officer has reasonable grounds to believe were used or threatened to be used in the
commission of the offense. The police officer may seize any firearms or ammunition that are
in plain view of the officer or were discovered pursuant to a consensual search, as necessary
for the protection of the officer or any family or household member.”); IND. CODE
§ 35-33-1-1.5(b) (West 2012) (“A law enforcement officer may confiscate and remove a
firearm, ammunition, or a deadly weapon from the scene if the law enforcement officer has:
(1) probable cause to believe that a crime involving domestic or family violence has
occurred; (2) a reasonable belief that the firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon: (A)
exposes the victim to an immediate risk of serious bodily injury; or (B) was an
instrumentality of the crime involving domestic or family violence; and (3) observed the
firearm, ammunition, or deadly weapon at the scene during the response.”).
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eighteen states allow police to confiscate firearms at a domestic-violence scene.143
Several of the laws use mandatory, rather than permissive, language requiring
police to confiscate firearms.144 The idea seems excellent. Unfortunately, however,
studies evaluating the impact of such confiscation laws on homicide rates have
generally found no statistically significant impact.145 Whether this lack of effect is
due to low enforcement or other reasons is not known.146
Worse, a leading study found that the existence of a confiscation law is
associated with higher assault and burglary rates.147 This finding raises the concern
that the confiscation of weapons at the scene leads batterers to retaliate through
nonlethal violence.148 The available evidence suggests that, though
confiscation-at-the-scene laws seem like a compelling approach, such laws may
bring more pain without reducing firearms homicide rates.
More promisingly, studies have found that laws disarming batterers under
restraining orders have a significant impact in reducing intimate-partner
homicides.149 There is also evidence that obtaining a protection order substantially
reduces the risk of future violence.150 Obtaining a restraining order and then
securing weapons removal based on the order has the advantage of interposing a
legally mandated distance between perpetrator and victim before the weapons are
removed. This is a safer approach than confiscating weapons at the scene while
leaving the enraged perpetrator—freshly bereft of expensive property—in
proximity to the target of violence.
Because a protective-order proceeding is civil, rather than criminal, there is a
less-intimidating standard of proof and process, thus exacting less of a toll on
victims.151 Still, many people experiencing intimate-partner violence do not obtain
a protective order: surveys have found that only between seventeen percent and
thirty-four percent of people experiencing intimate-partner violence obtained a
protective order.152 Many victims of assault who call police to stop the immediate

143. For a list of states, see Vigdor & Mercy, supra note 130, at 318.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 337; April M. Zeoli & Daniel W. Webster, Effects of Domestic Violence
Policies, Alcohol Taxes and Police Staffing Levels on Intimate Partner Homicide in Large
US Cities, 16 INJ. PREVENTION 90, 92 (2010).
146. Vigdor & Mercy, supra note 130, at 340.
147. Id. at 335.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 337; Zeoli & Webster, supra note 145, at 92.
150. Victoria L. Holt, Mary A. Kernic, Thomas Lumley, Marsha E. Wolf & Frederick P.
Rivara, Civil Protection Orders and Risk of Subsequent Police-Reported Violence, 288 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 589, 593 (2002); Victoria L. Holt, Mary A. Kernic, Marsha E. Wolf
& Frederick P. Rivara, Do Protection Orders Affect the Likelihood of Future Partner
Violence and Injury?, 24 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 16, 18 (2003); TK Logan & Robert
Walker, Civil Protective Order Effectiveness: Justice or Just A Piece of Paper?, 25
VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 332, 344–45 (2010).
151. TK Logan, Lisa Shannon, Robert Walker & Teri Marie Faragher, Protective Orders:
Questions and Conundrums, 7 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 175, 180 (2006).
152. E.g., PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES
OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 52 (2000), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1
/nij/181867.pdf (finding that only 17.1% of women physically assaulted by their intimate
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violence do not go on to access social services available to abuse victims.153
Reasons for not seeking further help and protective orders include fear of retaliation
for going to court to get a protective order, lack of resources to secure an order,
mistrust of the justice system, and a misperception regarding the effectiveness of
protection orders.154
Among those who do seek a protection order, advice from police about this
potential avenue of protection played an important role in enabling help seeking.155
For many people subject to violence within the home, an officer intervening to stop
the immediate violence during an emergency call may be the only opportunity for
exposure to outside counsel. Thus, police can play a crucial role in dispensing
information about protection orders. Systematizing police advice to assault victims
regarding how to obtain a protection order may bring more potentially dangerous
individuals to the attention of legal screens for firearms possession. To counteract
the misimpression that protective orders do not matter, officers can underscore the
preventive power of such interventions, including the fact that a protective order
will make it easier to disarm the perpetrator. Of course, such advice would not
substitute for legal guidance through the process of securing a restraining order
against an assailant. But police officers can play an important role in informing
potentially at-risk victims about the availability of protective orders and providing
information about community resources to help people through the process.
Federal grants to law enforcement agencies can create incentives to make such
scene-of-the-assault advice regarding protective orders a uniform practice. Indeed,
by executive action, President Obama has used the power of the federal purse to
incentivize state and local law enforcement to take action to improve
firearms-violence prevention, such as providing information to the federal
background check system.156 While the national executive cannot commandeer
state and local officials to do his bidding,157 monetary incentives are frequently
used to gain voluntary compliance to improve the uniformity of best practices.158
Federal grants to strengthen local capabilities and enhance training can be used to
systematize practices regarding identifying and advising victims in need of
protection orders.159
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Law enforcement officers are well versed in the scope of their power when it
comes to investigation, evidence seizure, and preservation and defusing of
immediate violence.160 Counseling of victims, in contrast, is less of a systematic
area of emphasis.161 Yet a well-established police role beyond ordinary
criminal-law enforcement is protecting public safety.162 Training police to inform
at-risk victims about protection orders and to identify community resources that
may help victims navigate the process is consistent with the police role of
protecting public safety. Such an approach can also help close the gap—discussed
in Part II—between the frequently observed risk factor of perpetration of
interpersonal violence in the month before the firearms homicide and infrequent
adjudication, which leads to blind spots in current laws disarming the dangerous.
CONCLUSION
After the national shock over mass shootings at Newtown, Navy Yard, Santa
Monica College, Virginia Tech, and elsewhere, the nation is hungry to prevent
firearms violence.163 One in five Americans polled by the Kaiser Health Tracking
Poll reported knowing someone who fell victim to gun violence—often a close
loved one. 164 Four in ten Americans expressed at least some worry about being
affected by gun violence personally.165 Since 2013, after the mass slaughter of
school children and teachers in Newtown, more than 1500 gun bills have been
introduced in Congress and state legislatures.166

(2009) (discussing examples of financial grants and training programs to coordinate
law-enforcement practices).
160. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2535 (1996) (discussing
sophisticated police training on rules regarding admissibility of evidence); Training
Materials, POLICE L. INST., http://www.policelaw.org/products/monthly-legal-review.html
(giving police monthly legal updates and online lessons).
161. Cf. Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence Cases,
69 UMKC L. REV. 33, 84 (2000) (calling for a therapeutic reorientation of responses to
domestic violence, including training of police in counseling skills to improve responses to
domestic violence).
162. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 405 (2006) (responding to domestic
disturbance); Mich. Dep’t of State v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (addressing threat to
public safety posed by drunk driving).
163. See, e.g., CHELSEA PARSONS & ANNE JOHNSON, YOUNG GUNS: HOW GUN VIOLENCE IS
DEVASTATING THE MILLENNIAL GENERATION 12 (2014) (reporting concerns among young
people); Kaiser Health Tracking Poll, Feb. 2013, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 27, 2013),
http://kff.org/disparities-policy/poll-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-february-2013/
(reporting concerns in a national sample of people polled); National Post-ABC News Poll,
April 11–14, 2013, WASH. POST. (May 22, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/page
/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2013/04/18/National-Politics/Polling/question_10456.xml?uuid
=hWtQiKhyEeKeHLsPsMLt2Q (reporting results of a national poll in which 52% of
respondents surveyed believed enacting laws to limit gun violence should be a higher priority).
164. Kaiser Health Tracking Poll, supra note 163.
165. Id.
166. State Gun Laws Report, supra note 20.

178

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 90:151

The high-horror events that jolted the nation to address firearms violence may
misguide the focus of attention, however, because of the tendency to focus on the
salient and overlook the prevalent.167 The paradigm of the dangerous in public
opinion and legislative proposals is the heavily armed, mentally disordered stranger
hunting in public.168 Yet as the data presented in Part II showed, there was a low
prevalence of known mental issues among perpetrators of homicide-suicides.
Mental-health problems may have been festering but unidentified. This means that
using mental-health problems as the key criterion for discerning the potentially
dangerous would miss the majority of those at risk for homicide-suicides.
Instead, the main risk factors for both firearms homicides generally and
extraordinary homicidal-suicidal violence feared by the public involve seemingly
mundane violence at home and among people who know one another. Examining
the history of perpetrators who escalate to extraordinary violence reveals that early
warning signs involve interpersonal violence. In many cases, such incidents of
violence are never addressed in the legal system, thereby evading existing firearms
restrictions triggered by adjudication. To improve firearms-violence prevention, it
is crucial to first understand who constitutes the dangerous missed by the law’s
current screens and why detection is undermined. This Article answered these
questions using recent National Violent Death Reporting System data.
It may be tempting to try to address the problem of red-flag violence slipping
through current firearms-restrictions laws by trying to expand legal restrictions to
cover unadjudicated violence. However, such an approach of adding new
firearms-restrictions laws faces major political hurdles.169 A more attainable
approach is to focus on executive action steering law-enforcement discretion. This
Article proffers a proposal focused on scene-of-the-assault procedure that can be
achieved through executive action regardless of whether new laws survive the
formidable gauntlet for adding new firearms restrictions.
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